Legislature(2021 - 2022)GRUENBERG 120
03/10/2021 01:30 PM House JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB105 | |
| HB3 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | HB 3 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| *+ | HB 57 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 105 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HB 3-DEFINITION OF "DISASTER": CYBERSECURITY
1:56:49 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 3, "An Act relating to the definition of
'disaster.'" [Before the committee was CSHB 3(STA).]
1:57:07 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 1:57 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.
2:00:48 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that this is the first hearing of CSHB 3(STA)
in this committee.
2:01:02 PM
ERICK CORDERO-GIORGANA, Staff, Representative DeLena Johnson,
Alaska State Legislature, assisted in introducing CSHB 3(STA) on
behalf of Representative Johnson, prime sponsor. He stated that
Alaska statute is vague about whether a cyberattack or
cyberthreat could elicit an emergency declaration. He explained
that HB 3 would add cybersecurity to the definition of a
disaster to update Alaska's laws, give clarity, and if
necessary, use resources to act if there is a widespread and
imminent threat. There is an alarming rate of cyberthreat
throughout the world and nation, he pointed out. Not long ago
the Matanuska-Susitna (Mat-Su) Borough was shut down after a
cyberattack, creating severe disruptions in the day-to-day
service and operation of the local government. The City of
Valdez was the target of a ransomware attack, and many funds
were spent to again be able to access the city's information.
The states of Louisiana, Florida, and Colorado declared an
emergency after a cyberattack disrupted most of their government
operations not too long ago.
2:02:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DELENA JOHNSON, Alaska State Legislature, as the
prime sponsor, introduced CSHB 3(STA). She stated that
cybersecurity needs to be added to the list of reasons for an
emergency declaration. She explained that a disaster
declaration would provide for disaster relief funds, to apply
for federal funds and resources that might not otherwise be
readily available, for disaster preparedness planning, and to
provide for intervention when the security of Alaska residents
has been compromised. She deferred to Mr. Cordero-Giorgana to
continue discussing the bill.
2:03:47 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA reiterated that CSHB 3(STA) would add
cybersecurity attacks and threats to the definition of a
disaster. He said the bill would add [subparagraph] (F) to AS
[26.23.900(2)] within the general provisions of the Alaska
Disaster Act. He read from the proposed subparagraph, which
read as follows:
(F) a cybersecurity attack that affects critical
infrastructure in the state, an information system
owned or operated by the state or a political
subdivision of the state, information that is stored
on, processed by, or transmitted on an information
system owned or operated by the state or a political
subdivision of the state, or a credible threat of an
imminent cybersecurity attack or cybersecurity
vulnerability that the commissioner of administration
or commissioner's designee certifies to the governor
has a high probability of occurring in the near
future; the certification must be based on specific
information that critical infrastructure in the state,
an information system owned or operated by the state
or a political subdivision of the state, or
information that is stored on, processed by, or
transmitted on an information system owned or operated
by the state or a political subdivision of the state
may be affected;
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA noted that the changes in the committee
substitute before the committee, CSHB 3(STA) added the words
"political subdivision" to page 2, lines 19 and 21. He
explained that this was done for clarity to ensure that boroughs
and local governments were not left out.
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA stressed that the bill is necessary given
that nowadays it is heard in the news about foreign governments
trying to hack U.S. computer systems, which includes U.S.
electric grids, hospitals, airports, and services that provide
energy or critical infrastructure. He allowed that the meaning
of critical infrastructure is currently open to interpretation
but advised that the duty to make that definition rests with the
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, but the department
was unable to come before the committee today.
2:07:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN requested a definition of "cybersecurity"
and noted that the term is not defined here. He further asked
whether it is defined elsewhere in statute or whether something
would be used to reference the meaning of the term.
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA replied that it would be technical
definitions by professionals for cybersecurity and cyberthreat.
Usually, he continued, they are defined as events that result in
data exposure, data loss, outright alteration, or impact to a
service. He stated that there is no exact definition in statute
and that cybersecurity, like technology, keeps changing on a
day-to-day basis so that today's definition may [be different
from a future definition].
2:08:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND said she appreciates the bill's intent.
She said she understands from Mr. Cordero-Giorgana's testimony
that a political subdivision of the state would be a borough or
municipality. She noted that school districts and the
University of Alaska have massive databases and asked whether
they would be considered political subdivisions of the state.
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON qualified she is speaking from experience
and not immediate research, but her understanding is that a
school district would fall under a borough. She related that
the boroughs in Alaska were originally created in 1964 to
oversee and dispense money to the school districts. So, she
continued, the political subdivision in that instance would be a
borough. The unorganized borough would be under the state and
under the state's purview. The University of Alaska is not
identified as a political subdivision of the state and it's not
an incorporated borough or municipality or city, so her belief
is that it would fall under State of Alaska equipment. She
offered to get back to the committee with details if requested.
2:10:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND stated that the computer systems of the
Anchorage School District (ASD) are totally separate from those
of the Municipality of Anchorage. Given there have been
arguments over the last 20 years about whether they should be
combined she said she isn't sure the aforementioned would apply
to a school district that is ultimately governed by that borough
or municipality which used to be a borough and a city. She said
she thinks Representative Johnson is covering the regional
educational attendance areas (REAAs) in the unorganized borough.
She added that the state gives the school districts roughly $1.2
billion to spend, and if [the districts' systems] were breached
in a cybersecurity attack, then a lot of services would be at
risk.
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND, responding to Chair Claman, requested
clarity on what is included in the list of political
subdivisions. She said if it doesn't cover school districts and
the university, she would like to find a way to cover them.
2:12:04 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KURKA said he is cautious about increasing
emergency powers because he is concerned about abuse. He
requested an explanation on how an emergency declaration would
help the state or political subdivision resolve the damage of a
security breach and how it would be different with an emergency
declaration as opposed to how the state operates now.
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON replied that a widespread and life-
threatening example would be a compromise of the power grid
during the winter, given the grid is run by computers. This
example would be an occasion where additional funds and help
from federal experts would potentially be needed for resolution.
2:14:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CLAMAN opened invited testimony on CSHB 3(STA).
2:14:44 PM
ERIC WYATT, Information Technology (IT) Director, Matanuska-
Susitna Borough, related that in 2018 the borough was the target
of a cyberattack by four different organizations rather than a
single attacker. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
analysis found that the attackers were four nation states by
means of some of the worst viruses. In the attack, one of them
got in and then sold it to the other organizations. The
borough's data was stolen, and its systems disrupted, then one
of the groups demanded ransom. The attack brought down all the
borough's information systems, completely cutting off the
borough from all Internet services and all the data that it
continuously used day to day to conduct borough business.
MR. WYATT said the effect on operations within the borough was
most notably on the borough's fire and emergency medical service
(EMS) systems. Also affected were operations and maintenance
for taking care of roads and solid waste, as well as finances
and legal every aspect of the borough was taken down. When
all that was shut off, all the people who used the borough's
information system - telephones, computers, and so forth - were
dead in the water. The magnitude was that everything was shut
down for quite some time. The borough was able to slowly bring
back services, getting back to about 95 percent capacity in
about 60 days.
MR. WYATT explained that to recover at the time without an
emergency declaration, the borough had to bring its emergency
funds to bear. But what was needed most to recover the systems
at the time was additional manpower, so the borough used its
emergency funds to hire additional resources to come help,
including Peter House of Deeptree, Inc. Several other
organizations also volunteered their help, including Mark
Breunig, Chief Information Security Officer, Department of
Administration. The borough's needs for recovery at the time
were monetary resources and skilled manpower to get its
operations back online. Mr. Wyatt stressed that the ability to
declare a disaster and form a team of experts as volunteers or
paid manpower to help recover is absolutely critical. The
borough used nearly $2.5 million in emergency funding for its
initial recovery and then more was spent on continued recovery.
MR. WYATT pointed out that the same week the Mat-Su Borough was
hit, the City of Valdez was hit by mostly the same groups, same
viruses, and same tactics. It is heard all the time about other
states and other cities [being hit] and there have been other
attacks in the state of Alaska as well. So, he emphasized, the
ability to come to the aid of the organization and plus-up the
manpower and resources to recover is absolutely vital, and the
borough would like to participate.
MR. WYATT further noted that the borough's critical
infrastructure its electric grid, telecommunications, gas
lines all run on these same kinds of systems. Therefore, the
effects from a cyberattack are greatly damaging and include
power and gas outages.
2:20:56 PM
MARK BREUNIG, Chief Information Security Officer, Department of
Administration, stated that the National Guard has a national
mandate for cyber-capability to be created in states, but
currently, without the language under CSHB 3(STA), there is no
legal standing to do it, and the state would not be able to
avail itself of the existing resources.
2:22:30 PM
NILS ANDREASSEN, Executive Director, Alaska Municipal League,
testified in support of CSHB 3(STA) and emphasized the
importance of cybersecurity to Alaska's local governments,
school districts, and state agencies. He spoke about risks of
destabilization and opined that "including this in the
definition of state disaster" is imperative.
2:23:47 PM
PETER HOUSE, CEO, Deeptree, Inc., said Deeptree, Inc. is a firm
that specializes in cybersecurity. He mentioned the zeitgeist
and a solar wind attack that resulted in significant
consequences for the federal government, fortune 500 companies,
and organizations in Alaska. He talked about an attack on e-
mail servers that hit approximately 30,000 American
organizations and double that worldwide, which has been
attributed largely to the Chinese. He said there have been high
visibility attacks showing a higher level of aggression, both
from criminal organizations and nation state adversaries. He
related that in the fourth quarter of 2020, cyber software moved
from a soft market to a hard market, which mean that "the
portfolio for the insurance company is under pressure," and it
usually results in rate increases. He said the attribution by
insurance companies for this change is that the number of cyber
attacks and the total size of the claim are both increasing
substantially, with a 20 to 40 percent rate increase expected
across different cyber insurance carriers countrywide.
MR. HOUSE stated that in general there is a higher level of
aggression. He gave as an example from Yankee Buckshot wherein,
using off-the-shelf, publicly downloadable tools, the U.S.
Department of Defense "attacked itself" to test its defenses and
was able to get onto its classified network. He said there is
challenge in working with these complex systems; sometimes
attackers can "make it in past the border" and "reap a
significant amount of damage."
MR. HOUSE addressed Representative Kurka's question regarding
the benefit of allowing a declaration of emergency. He gave a
scenario wherein assets are required to hold evidence for law
enforcement or insurance. That is data or logs that need to be
tendered over to the organization from a hard drive. He said
those systems cost $20,000 and higher. If the systems are set
aside for evidence retention, they cannot be used for the
restoration of services or to clean or sanitize the systems.
The result is a need for double or triple the amount of storage
capacity to run the organization day to day. He explained, "By
opening up the degrees of freedom, either through funds or other
forms of response, there's an ability for an organization to get
back on its feet quicker than if they were to try to ... use a
slow methodology of moving a little bit at a time, which then
stretches out the rate of recovery to a much longer period of
time."
MR. HOUSE said Alaska is a smaller state, with fewer than a
million people, and "this type of line of work is very
specialized and difficult." He estimated there are 50-100
people in Alaska who are qualified to do digital forensics and
incident response, and he pointed out that it would be difficult
for them to respond [to an emergency situation] because "a lot
of them will be fighting their own fires." Therefore, he
emphasized that the ability to pull in contractors and resources
from Outside is essential. He said he believes the language of
CSHB 3(STA) would open up that degree of freedom, "in addition
to what Mr. Breunig indicated." He noted that when he worked
with Mr. Breunig and Mr. Wyatt on the incident with the Mat-Su
Borough, the expansion of capability from the emergency funds
had a positive impact; there was a wave of momentum that was
beneficial.
2:29:45 PM
MR. ANDREASSEN, in response to Chair Claman's request that he
address Representative Drummond's question about political
subdivisions, offered the definition of political subdivision,
which appears under AS 26.23.900(7), as follows:
(7) "political subdivision" means
(A) a municipality;
(B) an unincorporated village; or
(C) another unit of local government;
MR. ANDREASSEN said it is the understanding of the Alaska
Municipal League that school districts would be covered under
political subdivision of the state. He said school districts
are either a subdivision of a municipality or are the
responsibility of the Department of Education and Early
Development. He offered his understanding that the University
of Alaska is considered a political subdivision, "but separately
under state law."
2:31:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND referenced definitions found under AS
39.90.140, [which states that "public body" includes "an officer
or agency of" the federal government, state, and political
subdivision - subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively],
and she read that which is included under "political
subdivision", in paragraph (4), subparagraph (C), sub-
subparagraphs (i), (ii), and (iii), which read:
(i) a municipality;
(ii) a school district; and
(iii) a regional educational attendance area;
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND noted that the University of Alaska and
the Alaska Railroad are not included under [subparagraph (C)].
[They are listed subsequently in subparagraphs (D) and (E), of
paragraph (4), regarding "public body".]
2:33:12 PM
MR. BREUNIG, in response to the same question, said it is not a
topic he can address.
2:33:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE noted that during a recent Finance
subcommittee meeting, Mr. Breunig had spoken about a recent
cyberattack and mentioned a type of incident command being
established under the Department of Administration for quick
response. She referenced language in CSHB 3(STA), on page 2,
[on lines 5 and 6], regarding "consultation with the
commissioner of public safety or a designee of the commissioner
of public safety", and she asked whether that wording fits the
organized structure Mr. Breunig is establishing within the
Department of Administration regarding cybersecurity and meets
the requires of statute.
2:34:46 PM
MR. BREUNIG responded that the "incident command structure"
(ICS) put out through the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), is part of an emergency management program and a
standard framework that all federal agencies use. The language
in the bill would not change that, he indicated. In response to
a request from Representative Vance, he spoke about work with
the Department of Military & Veterans' Affairs on an [incident
response] structure, which currently is not capable of handling
a large-scale incident.
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE said CSHB 3(STA) speaks to this issue, and
she encouraged efforts to speed up response to an incident.
2:38:36 PM
MR. BREUNIG recalled he had been talking about a solar wind
incident during the Finance subcommittee testimony and how speed
is of the essence when responding. He said it took departments
24 hours to report back whether they had vulnerable software, at
which point security was able to "lock that down" and determine
there had been no compromise. However, he emphasized that in
cyber terms, "24 hours is an eternity." He posited that CSHB
3(STA) is critical, because it would bring the right people
together to build the "speed to response."
2:39:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KURKA asked for a definition of "imminent
cybersecurity attack" and whether there exists a metric of
probably of attack.
2:40:54 PM
MR. BREUNIG replied that when there is imminent threat, there
would be an alert from the federal Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) regarding a known attack. State security
would watch out for it. That in itself is not a disaster, but
if the threat "got in" and caused damage, then it would be a
disaster. Regarding Microsoft, he said security knew early on
that it was coming and was "able to take practice steps" to
mitigate the risk, which he said is another example of imminent
threat. In response to a follow-up question, he mentioned a
"denial of service" attack in which someone floods a state
network segment with malicious traffic "in an attempt to
overwhelm it and take it down."
2:42:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KURKA said it sounds like cybersecurity attacks
are happening all the time in various degrees. He directed
attention to language in Section 1 of CSHB 3(STA), on page 1,
line 4, which gives a definition of disaster, including its
causes. He offered his understanding that "we're talking about
widespread damage of property," not just "one department had
some computers fried."
2:44:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON offered her understanding that the
concern is that there could be ongoing declarations of disaster.
She deferred to her staff to address the topic further.
2:45:23 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA proffered that "imminent" is a matter of
timing and "widespread" is a matter of geography and whether an
issue can be contained. When talking about a fire, earthquake,
or flood, the consideration is "the amount of resources that
would need to be used to be able to achieve the containment
goal." He said DMVA will create emergency plans for each
category listed in the Act and make recommendations as to what
would be considered widespread and imminent.
2:47:31 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KURKA indicated that the language in the proposed
legislation should be added, but observed that "a lot of the
context in which we're talking about this" is found in
subparagraph (D), [on page 2], regarding "enemy or terrorist
attack or a credible threat of imminent enemy or terrorist
attack in or against the state". He offered his understanding
that there had been a legal opinion as to "why this wouldn't
apply under (D)." He remarked that "all these examples we're
talking about ... seem to be foreign actors."
2:48:40 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN, in response to Representative Johnson, offered his
interpretation that Representative Kurka was reflecting that
subparagraph (D) doesn't seem to be cybersecurity-related and
perhaps wanted to know how the two issues are addressed when
determining whether an emergency has occurred.
2:49:21 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA, at the request of the bill sponsor,
addressed the question. He said the separation was done at the
recommendation of the bill drafter in Legislative Legal Services
to avoid confusion.
2:49:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE pointed out that CSHB 3(STA) speaks
specifically to disaster; "emergency" is not addressed. She
gave an example of a disaster being the landslide that recently
occurred in Haines, Alaska. She said the governor declared a
disaster in the Haines area, but it was not a statewide
emergency.
2:50:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked for the definition of
cybersecurity.
2:51:20 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA said he did not have a definition and
deferred to Mr. Breunig.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that it is common for courts to use the
dictionary for commonly used terms if those terms are not
defined in statute.
2:52:08 PM
MR. BREUNIG defined cybersecurity as "any protection used to
prevent cyber-attacks."
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said he is familiar with definition, and
it makes sense to him. He continued:
But in this case we're talking about a cybersecurity
attack, and so if we're using tools to prevent
attacks, but then we're ... adding the word "attack"
on them, I'm a little confused as what that [emphasis
on "that"] means.
MR. BREUNIG responded he thinks the intent is that it would be
an attack against [Alaska's] cybersecurity - against the systems
and tools that the state has to protect itself.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked for confirmation that what is being
discussed is an attack where "someone's trying to overcome some
type of security" as opposed to "a run-of-the-mill fiber
attack."
MR. BREUNIG answered, "Yes, I would agree."
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that the previously discussed
subparagraph (D), which addresses enemy or terrorist attack,
points to a definition of "attack" existing in [AS 26.20.200],
and since that definition does not fit what is being discussed
in the cyber realm, he suggested a definition may be necessary
in subparagraph (F).
MR. BREUNIG said he concurs with the bill sponsor and her staff
that the intent is to clarify. In subparagraph (D), "enemy" and
"terrorist attack" traditionally relate to military-related
attacks, not cyber-attacks, which are specifically addressed
under subparagraph (F), which allows the emergency operation
center to bring resources to bear in regard to cyberattacks
rather than other "traditional forms of disaster or emergency
attack that are already identified."
REPRESENTATIVE CLAMAN noted that subparagraph (F) is proposed
new language. He said a cyberattack would be, for example,
somebody getting into his home computer; a cybersecurity attack
would be on a larger scale.
MR. BREUNIG concurred.
2:56:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referenced a memorandum ("memo") from
[Megan Wallace of] Legislative Legal Services [to the bill
sponsor and staff, dated 2/10/20 and included in the committee
packet], to [subparagraph (C), which lists equipment failure as
one of the causes of a "disaster" and read as follows]:
(C) equipment failure, if the failure is not
a predictably frequent or recurring event or
preventable by adequate equipment maintenance or
operation;
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered his understanding that the memo
talks about "why ... [subparagraph] (C), equipment failure, ...
may not be adequate, and why this bill might be needed for that
reason." He asked to what extent it is the sponsor's intent "to
predicate the cybersecurity attacks we're talking about on
intentionality." He continued:
Because certainly, ... if we're focusing on
intentionality, then an IT tech who spills coffee and
destroys a server probably wouldn't be captured in the
intent that we're talking about here.
2:57:18 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON explained that intentionality must have
credible background. If [the attack] is imminent and
widespread, as determined by the commissioner or commissioner's
designee, he/she would determine that it was a credible threat.
She added, "The intentionality of maybe mindreading some would
not fall into that category."
2:58:13 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA said he was not sure he understood
Representative Eastman's question.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN indicated that [subparagraphs] (A), (B),
(C), and (E) address disasters that are not man-made and
intentional. He questioned whether it is important to "tie it
to that intentionality," as is being done in [subparagraph] (F)
or to be more focused on the impact. He asked, "Is there a
reason that we're making it narrower than ... just a larger
impact type of definition?"
2:59:52 PM
MR. CORDERO-GIORGANA noted that the legislature removed
"manmade" from the disaster Act, which caused ambiguity as to
whether cybersecurity qualified under the Act. He continued:
If a widespread system failure is the result of
another cause that is not manmade, or in this case an
attack or a threat, it actually would probably fall
into one of the other categories. So, in the case,
for example, of an earthquake: a system goes down,
but it's really the result of an earthquake, not
necessarily a cybersecurity attack. And so, if I'm
understanding correctly, this would actually clear
authority specifically to those type of items."
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether it is important to make a
distinction between "those manmade actions which are intentional
and which are accidental." For example, he said an installation
of "a security patch" that cause a major outage "wouldn't
qualify here" because it is not a cybersecurity attack, even
though it may have the same result if someone had done it
intentionally.
MR. CORDERO responded that that would be a cyber vulnerability,
and he indicated that was addressed in another part of
[subparagraph] (F). He said there are so many definitions that
could be included in the bill that would make it lengthy, for
example, for the following terms: cyberattacks, cyber
incidents, cyberthreats, major threats, minor threats, and
primary targets. He stated, "We're just trying to make it clear
that cybersecurity counts; give it an overview, and then it's up
to the Department of Military & Veterans' Affairs to come up
with ... plans."
3:02:22 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN remarked that a lot of this comes back to the size
and cost of what has happened.
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that CSHB 3(STA) was held over.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB 105 v. A 2.19.2021.PDF |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Transmittal Letter 2.18.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Sectional Analysis v. A 2.23.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Supporting Document - ABADA & AMHB Letter 3.5.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Testimony - Received as of 3.8.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Additional Document - Memo from DJJ to HJUD 3.9.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 v. A Amendments #1-2 HJUD 3.10.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 v. A Amendments #1-2 HJUD Final Votes 3.10.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Fiscal Note DOC-IDO 2.8.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Fiscal Note DHSS-PS 2.10.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Fiscal Note DPS-AST 2.12.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/29/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 105 Fiscal Note JUD-ACS 3.4.2021.pdf |
HHSS 4/15/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/17/2021 3:00:00 PM HHSS 4/27/2021 3:00:00 PM HJUD 3/5/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 105 |
| HB 3 v. G 3.8.2021.PDF |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Sponsor Statement 2.18.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Legal Memo 2.10.2020.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - Alaska Health Department Reports Data Breach The Seattle Times 6.28.2018.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - DHSS Cyber Attack Impacts More Than 100,000 Alaska Households 1.23.2019.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - How One Alaskan Borough Survived A Cyber Attack CitiesSpeak 10.1.2019.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - MSBD Press Release Mat-Su Declares Disaster for Cyber Attack 7.31.2018.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - Pipeline Article Alaska Public Media 3.14.2018.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Supporting Document - CISA Critical Infrastructure 2.23.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HSTA 2/23/2021 3:00:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 3 Fiscal Note DOA-OIT 2.21.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 3 |
| HB 57 v. B 2.18.2021.PDF |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Sponsor Statement 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Sectional Analysis v. B 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - OMB Letter 7.12.2019.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - CBR Sweep Breakdown by Fund - LFD March 2020 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - AEA Memo on PCE Sweep 8.24.2019.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - Hickel v. Cowper May 27, 1994 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - Legislative Finance Outline of AS 37.10.420 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - Legislative Research Memo GF Definitions 9.1.2020.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - FY19 Single Audit - Finding No. 2019-089 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Additional Document - FY20 CAFR General Fund Accounts 3.8.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 PowerPoint Presentation 3.10.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/24/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/29/2021 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/5/2021 1:00:00 PM |
HB 57 |
| HB 57 Fiscal Note GOV-OMB 3.6.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM |
|
| HB 3 Testimony - Received as of 2.22.2021.pdf |
HJUD 3/10/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/15/2021 1:30:00 PM HJUD 3/17/2021 1:30:00 PM |
HB 3 |